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Abstract
The current Defense Strategy assigns Special Operations Forces (SOF) to
play a central role in countering terrorism, weapons of mass destruction,
and irregular warfare. However, there has been little published that
defines the role of Special Operations alongside air, land, and sea
domains. The U.S. Special Operations Community struggles to define its
own theoretical concepts such as direct approach and indirect approach.
The U.S. SOF circles typically define direct approach with direct action
and the indirect approach with foreign internal defense or security force
assistance. Military theorist Liddell Hart viewed the indirect approach as
a method to orient upon, target, and upset an adversary’s equilibrium in
order to plan for and direct decisive blows. Today, the SOF indirect
approach is arguable more applicable due to the prevalence of non-state
threats and internal conflicts. Following Hart’s definition, precision raids
are among the integral components of a broader application of the
indirect approach. The approach also networks U.S. government power
as a force when used in concert with allies and local partners. Global
networking along with balanced precision raids will exponentially
increase the utility of SOF power and position it to appropriately
complement all domains to tackle 21st century challenges.
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Introduction1 
Most military professionals and historians are familiar with the theories and 
concepts of air, maritime, and land power, but there has been little in the way of 
theory or concept as to what Special Operations power means and its strategic 
utility alongside those of the air, maritime, and land domains.   Yet Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) must play a central role in several of the primary 
missions of the U.S. Armed Forces as projected in the Defense Strategy entitled 
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, such as 
countering terrorism, irregular warfare, and countering weapons of mass 
destruction.   The importance of Special Operations to this new strategy was 
underscored in the accompanying remarks made by former Secretary of Defense 
Leon Panetta during the January 5, 2012 unveiling of the new defense strategy 
where he mentioned specifically, “as we reduce the overall defense budget, we 
will protect, and in some cases increase, our investments in special operations 
forces.”  Therefore, understanding the role of SOF power and how it fits within 
strategy is an essential prerequisite to successfully implementing the U.S.  
Defense Strategy.   
 
Recalibrating the Current SOF Interpretation of the Direct and 
Indirect Approaches 
Within the U.S. Special Operations community there has been a considerable 
amount of theoretical discussion, attempting to more clearly characterize the 
“indirect approach” as it relates to the “direct approach” in a Special Operations 
context.  The familiar understanding in U.S. SOF circles generally associates the 
direct approach with direct action (DA), and the indirect approach with foreign 
internal defense (FID) or security force assistance (SFA).  In some quarters 
current interpretations of these two approaches represent what is nearly a 
cultural schism within Special Operations due to the very different focus and skill 
sets associated with them.  In order to understand SOF power, one first needs a 
recalibrated view of the direct and indirect approach frames of reference from a 
broader strategic vantage point.  
An informative start point for exploring these topics to better define and 
understand the strategic utility and value of SOF power is to revert back to first 
principles and reconsider the roots and origins of the indirect approach.  Former 
British soldier, historian, and military theorist Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart is 
historically credited with defining the indirect approach in his work, the “Strategy 
of Indirect Approach,” where he asserted: “. . . throughout the ages decisive 
results in war have only been reached when the approach has been indirect.  In 
strategy the longest way round is apt to be the shortest way home.”2  This indirect 
approach of Hart focused on targeting the balance or equilibrium of an adversary 
noting, “while the strength of an enemy country lies outwardly in its numbers and 
resources, these are fundamentally dependent upon stability or equilibrium of 
control, morale, and supply.”3   
                                                        
1 This article was originally published in PRISM 4:3 (2014), National Defense University, 
Washington, D.C.  It is re-printed with permission from PRISM. 
2 Liddell Hart, Strategy of the Indirect Approach, (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1941), 4.  
3 Ibid, 5.  
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The central premise of the indirect approach is to orient upon, target, and upset 
an adversary’s equilibrium or balance to set up and enable follow-on decisive 
blows to be landed.  Hart goes on to explain with an athletic metaphor that a 
direct approach without the preparatory shaping of an indirect lead is often a 
blunt and raw methodology that typically results in an adverse outcome; “In war 
as in wrestling the attempt to throw the opponent without loosening his foothold 
and balance can only result in self-exhaustion increasing in disproportionate 
ration to the effective strain put upon him.  Victory by such a method can only be 
possible through an immense margin of superior strength in some form, and, 
even so, tends to lose decisiveness.”4  From his historical analysis of the indirect 
approach vice the direct approach, Hart became convinced that, “More and more 
clearly the fact emerged that a direct approach to one’s mental object, or physical 
objective, along the ‘line of natural expectation’ for the opponent, has ever tended 
to, and usually produced negative results.”5  While the context of Hart’s theory 
stemmed from observations of state on state conflict, the indirect approach is 
arguably more applicable in the complex operating environment of the 21st 
century where non-state threats and internal conflicts dominate the security 
landscape.  
The Indirect Approach and SOF Power 
In some circles a degree of cynicism is expressed when Special Operations are 
explained as small unit tactical actions performed by specially organized, trained, 
and equipped forces aimed at achieving strategic and operational effects.  SOF 
alone are not a panacea or substitute, but they provide significant complementary 
capabilities to those of the air, land, and maritime domains.  In fact, a great deal 
of what allows SOF to perform in a special manner are the enabling capabilities, 
in many cases leveraged from outside of SOF, such as:  
“mobility, aerial sensors, field medics, remote logistics, engineering 
planners, construction, intelligence, regional specialists, interpreters/ 
translators, communications, dog teams, close air support specialists, 
security forces, and others that permit SOF operators to focus more 
directly on their missions.”6  
What SOF do however, is bring together a potent and unique mix of capabilities 
to the defense portfolio that enables pursuit of this indirect approach with an 
effect or outcome that is grossly disproportionate to the investment in resources.  
The SOF core activities identified by the U.S. Special Operations Command are: 
Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, Unconventional Warfare, Foreign 
Internal Defense, Civil Affairs Operations, Counterterrorism, Psychological 
Operations, Information Operations, Counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, Security Force Assistance, Counterinsurgency Operations, and 
Activities Specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF).7 
Collectively, these core activities provide a toolbox for pursuing the strategic 
                                                        
4 Ibid, 4.  
5 Ibid, 4.  
6 Eric T.  Olson, “U.S. Special Operations: Context and Capabilities in Irregular Warfare,” Joint 
Forces Quarterly 56 (1st Qtr 2010): 68.  
7 “About United States Special Operations Command Webpage,” USSOCOM, available at: 
http://www.socom.mil/Pages/AboutUSSOCOM.aspx.  
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indirect approach.  SOF power is the ability to apply the precise effects of these 
collective capabilities at carefully calibrated points of the adversary’s balance or 
equilibrium described by Hart, whether that opponent is a state, non-state, or 
irregular actor in the form of an insurgent challenging an incumbent allied 
government.  These capabilities might include the surgical application of force 
through offensive action, more methodical long-term efforts that support and 
influence others through training, advice, and assistance, or as in most instances 
a combination of both.   
A strategy of support and influence seeks to achieve a positional advantage, 
exercised primarily via local indigenous forces to undermine the foundation and 
environment that enables the equilibrium or balance of an adversary.  These local 
forces empowered with indigenous knowledge and information, enabled with 
advice and assistance, are capable of eroding an adversary’s balance over time.  
These longer term support and influence efforts, complemented by carefully 
calibrated, high tempo offensive action driven by high fidelity intelligence, 
combine to achieve, through a strategic indirect approach, what John Arquilla 
and David Rondfeldt described as “swarming” to disrupt command and control, 
deny sanctuary, interdict lines of communication, gather information and 
provide strategic anticipation to inform follow-on actions and decisions.8  The 
tools of the current interpretation of the direct approach as it is known today, 
primarily offensive operations in the form of high tempo precision raids, are in 
fact integral components of a broader application of the strategic indirect 
approach.  Obtaining clarity on this topic is critically important, as the value and 
utility of SOF power operating in this strategic indirect manner are particularly 
relevant to the threats and challenges faced in the 21st century security 
environment.  
Facing Nefarious Networked Actors and Today’s Paradigm for 
Conflict 
It is no secret that the technological impact on telecommunications and modern 
transportation has made the world more interconnected.  It has revolutionized 
how we look at commerce and business through a global lens of interdependence.  
As a result, the global international security landscape is inherently more 
complicated due to the same interconnected nature found in today’s world of 
interdependent financial markets and commerce.  The nature of today’s threats 
and challenges is characterized by a complex network of nefarious state and non-
state actors ranging from insurgents and terrorists to traffickers, financial 
institutions, and drug cartels who collaborate wittingly and unwittingly through 
relationships of opportunity, convenience, dependence, shared ideology, like 
causes, common enemies, financial gain and brotherhood.  Iran by many 
accounts, for example, has become extremely adept at leveraging a diverse global 
network of nefarious entities.  The balance or equilibrium, referred to by Hart, of 
this loosely affiliated network is similarly complex, amorphous, and dynamic.  
We have seen this in over more than a decade of conflict against the network of 
al-Qaida.  
Arquilla and Ronfeldt are not frequently credited for their concept articulated as 
                                                        
8 Arguilla, John and David Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar (Santa Monica: RAND,1996), 57.  
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early as 1996, “It takes a network to fight networks.”  Today this phrase is 
unfortunately bantered about and attributed to others with little of the contextual 
substance and detailed understanding that made their observation so profound 
and prophetic.  In the aftermath of September 2001 in a follow-on piece entitled 
“The Advent of Netwar (Revisited),” the authors brought the issue into sharper 
focus:  
“It takes networks to fight networks.  Governments that want to defend 
against netwar may have to adopt organizational designs and strategies 
like those of their adversaries.  This does not mean mirroring the 
adversary, but rather learning to draw on the same design principles that 
he has already learned about the rise of network forms in the information 
age.  These principles depend to some extent on technological innovation, 
but mainly on a willingness to innovate organizationally and doctrinally, 
perhaps especially by building new mechanisms for interagency and 
multijurisdictional cooperation.”9 
This concept of requiring more dynamic configurations to enable combating 
networked nefarious actors bears relation to another key work by the same 
authors written for RAND in 1997 entitled, “A New Epoch and Spectrum of 
Conflict,” that metaphorically describes the paradigm shift required to fight these 
“netwars” of the future.  In this work, the traditional Western game of chess is 
juxtaposed as the frame of reference representing the past against the Chinese 
game of Go to describe the nature of the strategic paradigm shift to the future:   
“Thus Go, in contrast to chess, is more about distributing one’s pieces 
than about massing them.  It is more about proactive insertion and 
presence than about maneuver.  It is more about deciding where to stand 
than whether to advance or retreat.  It is more about developing web-like 
links among nearby stationary pieces than about moving specialized 
pieces in combined operations.  It is more about creating networks of 
pieces than about protecting hierarchies of pieces.  It is more about 
fighting to create secure territories than about fighting to the death of 
one’s pieces.  Further, there is often a blurring of offense and defense—a 
single move may both attack and defend simultaneously.  Finally, the use 
of massed concentrations is to be avoided, especially in the early phases of 
a game, as they may represent a misuse of time and later be susceptible to 
implosive attacks.  This is quite different from chess, which is generally 
linear, and in which offense and defense are usually easily distinguished, 
and massing is a virtue.  Future conflicts will likely resemble the game of 
Go more than the game of chess.”10  
The work of these two authors will prove over time to be as consequential to 
understanding warfare in the 21st century as the thoughts of Clausewitz were to 
the 20th century martial art.  
                                                        
9 Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt, “The Advent of Netwar (Revisited),” in John Arquilla and 
David Ronfeldt (eds.), Networds and Netwars: The Future of Terror Crime, and Militancy (Santa 
Monica: RAND, 2001), 15.  
10 Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt, “A New Epoch and Spectrum of Conflict,” in John Arquilla 
and David Ronfeldt (eds.), In Athena’s Camp, Preparing for the Conflict in the Information Age 
(Santa Monica: RAND, 1997), 163.  
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The centrally important role of networks to counter nefarious networks of the 
21st century has not been lost upon the United States Government after a decade 
plus of war against the al-Qaida network.  Across innumerable U.S. national 
security policy documents the inexorable fact of life that the United States cannot 
go it alone and must work with other international actors in a comprehensive 
whole of government manner to achieve common security interests resonates 
with unmistakable clarity.  Former Secretary of Defense Panetta emphasized the 
importance of this in a speech at the U.S. Institute of Peace in June of 2012 where 
he said, “In the 21st century, we must build partnerships that enable us to better 
meet a wider range of challenges.  To that end, I see us building networks that 
leverage our unique capabilities—and the unique strengths of our allies and 
partners that share common interests—to confront the critical challenges of the 
future.” He again reiterated this theme further in a briefing at the Pentagon in 
October while speaking about the ongoing implementation of the new U.S. 
Defense Strategy against the backdrop of fiscal challenges, “But one important 
way that we are going to do this is to strengthen our network of defense Alliances 
around the globe.” 
The Networking of SOF Power 
With the formidable array of SOF fielded by the United States, some might 
question the utility and need for closer networking of U.S. SOF with allied and 
partner SOF around the world.  As former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
Ms. Michelle Flournoy once insightfully remarked, allies and partners of the 
United States are more than “nice to have” or “window dressing,” but are instead 
essential for achieving our security interests in today’s world.  The ultimate 
strategic utility of SOF power is applying a classic reinterpretation of Sir Basil 
Henry Liddell Hart’s indirect approach to leverage SOF as a force multiplier and 
economy of force instrument to upset an adversary’s equilibrium and balance 
through proactive and preventative insertion, presence, and action in 
coordination with a multinational collaborative network of SOF networks.  
A robust and focused effort to build a global SOF network of networks supports 
the U.S. defense strategy in three major ways.  The first is that this global 
networking of SOF builds relationships that engender trust and confidence 
among different national SOF elements enabling more effective, efficient, and 
coherent multinational employment and collaboration among SOF.  The central 
importance of relationships cannot be over-emphasized; in fact this is the center 
of gravity relative to a multinational SOF network.  This is especially important to 
SOF as they are in most nations a close-knit insular community stemming from 
their sensitive strategic and operational work that is inherently classified; often of 
a low visibility, clandestine, or covert nature; and quite often depends on a high 
degree of operational security for success and force protection.  As a result, 
collaboration among multinational SOF depends first and foremost upon trust 
and confidence that underpins relationships between commanders, staffs, and 
SOF operators.  However, without undergirding and codifying these relationships 
in a habitual, enduring, and substantive manner, working collaboratively 
alongside allies’ and partners’ SOF will never rise above a baseline threshold of 
effectiveness.  What is required to build these relationships is more than 
transactional episodic interactions.   
Transactional relationships, or those forged under the duress of hurried timelines 
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are less effective, as they lack the critical foundation that leads to trust and 
confidence.  The quality of these relationships is proportional to the value and 
output of the relationships.  Substantive and enduring relationships that yield 
results require an investment of time, energy, and resources.  These relationships 
entail understanding the culture and ethos of the different SOF elements, as well 
as organizational and individual capabilities, limitations, idiosyncrasies, and 
terminology.  Concepts that engender and foster these enduring relationships 
among the global network of multinational SOF support the “system of defense 
Alliances and security partnerships” described by the Secretary of Defense as 
“one of America’s greatest national security assets.”  Secretary Panetta went on to 
point out that “No other nation in the world really has this asset,” and that “These 
relationships are sound investments in an era of fiscal challenges and they really 
do pay dividends.”11  His assertion on the efficacy of these networks in response 
to the associated investment reaffirms the findings of seminal studies of network 
effectiveness by Professors Keith Provan, Brinton Milward, and Alex Turrini and 
others over the last decade that indicate network leadership and associated 
resource munificence are some of the key characteristics required to build 
effective networks.12 
The second way this SOF network of networks is supportive of the U.S. Defense 
Strategy is by building allied and partner SOF national capabilities for both self-
defense and their contribution to future coalition operations.  Without the 
appropriate capability, capacity, and interoperability, allied and partner SOF will 
not be postured to work effectively alongside U.S. SOF, and therefore will have 
diminished utility in burden sharing.  Secretary of Defense Panetta highlighted 
the importance of this in remarks at the Pentagon stating,  
“Indeed, I think it is fair to say that a vital pillar of the new defense 
strategy that we released this year is the important work of developing 
and deepening ties to other nations; developing their capabilities and 
building new Alliances and partnerships to build stability and security.  
This is one of the keys to the Defense force we are trying to build for the 
21st Century.”13 
The third and no less critical way in which U.S. leadership of a SOF network of 
networks supports the U.S. Defense Strategy is by providing U.S. SOF with 
peacetime and contingency access.  Access not only in a classic sense in terms of 
infrastructure such as airfields, ports and training opportunities, but more 
                                                        
11 Secretary of Defense Leon E.  Panetta and General Martin E.  Dempsey (CJCS), Department of 
Defense News Briefing from the Pentagon, October 25, 2012, available at: 
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5143.  
12 Keith G.  Provan and H.  Brinton Milward, “Do Networks Really Work? A Framework for 
Evaluating Public-Sector Organized Networks,” Public Administration Review 56:4 (July/August 
2001): 68; Alex Turrini et al, “Networking Literature about Determinants of Network 
Effectiveness,” Public Administration 88:2 (2010): 540-45; Joerge Raab, “Heading Towards a 
Network Theory of Effectiveness: Combining Structure and Governance,” Presentation at the 
University of Southern California Sol Price School of Public Policy Bedrosian Center, March 28, 
2011, available at: http://www.youtube.com/warch?v=ksriE7B3eIM.  
13 Karen Parrish, “Panetta: Defense Alliances Key to 21st Century Security,” American Forces Press 
Service, October 25, 2012, available at: 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=118346. 
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importantly access to information, knowledge, understanding, perspective and 
legitimacy that are essential ingredients to operating successfully in the complex 
operational environment of the 21st century.  As the 2008 U.S. Defense Strategy 
described, “Allies often possess capabilities, skills, and knowledge we cannot 
duplicate.”14  It is for that reason that the global SOF network of networks enables 
a shared comprehensive understanding of today’s challenges, threats, and issues 
that provides a broad and in depth appreciation for the nature of the problem as a 
point of departure for designing and implementing collaborative solutions.  
Conclusion 
We recognize that the nature of the nefarious networked adversary is dynamic 
and complex, requiring an adaptive, agile, and collaborative response.  Arquilla 
and Ronfeldt postulated that applying the networks to fight networks paradigm 
would require “a willingness to innovate organizationally and doctrinally, 
perhaps especially by building new mechanisms for interagency and 
multijurisdictional cooperation.”  The wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the broader 
“global war on terror” stimulated more collaborative “out of the box” interagency 
networked collaboration to include that of a multinational nature in some cases, 
but there is a need to evolve and push the innovation further to enable the 
application of appropriate lethal and nonlethal authorities, capacities, and 
capabilities against adversary networks in the most effective, efficient and 
coherent manner.  This innovative principle is well understood by the 
Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, Admiral William H. McRaven, 
who is pursuing multiple efforts along these lines to stimulate and implement 
precepts originally put forward by Arquilla and Ronfeldt on how to counter the 
phenomenon of “netwar.”  The first of these initiatives is to engender and 
invigorate a multinational collaborative SOF network of networks around the 
world, and the other is to focus on and enhance a networked U.S. SOF 
relationship across the U.S. interagency community.  
The modern version of the indirect approach is where networks of like-minded 
actors on today’s game board of international security achieve strategic presence 
through proactive and preventative insertion and activity to undermine the 
balance and equilibrium of the adversarial networked actors.  While networking 
as described by the Secretary of Defense is not uniquely applicable to SOF, in 
some cases U.S. SOF alongside allied and partner SOF, are already serving as the 
vanguard for precisely the type of organizational, doctrinal, and mechanistic 
innovation and cooperation described by Arquilla and Rondfeldt over a decade 
and a half ago.  SOF is ideally suited to lead these innovative efforts and serve as 
an enabler and catalyst to engender greater multinational and inter-agency 
collaboration through a comprehensive approach.  This global networking of SOF 
through a SOF network of networks will exponentially increase the utility of SOF 
power and position it appropriately to complement air, maritime, and land power 
in the 21st century.  
                                                        
14 U.S. Department of Defense, “National Defense Strategy 2008,” (U.S. DoD: Washington, D.C., 
2008), 20.  
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